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1 - Introduction 
 A general appreciation of our world seems to presage a rather problematic tendency in 
the coming decades: the rise in the demand for natural resources. If kept unchanged, the 
current trend of exponential demographic growth will entail a generalized rise in the demand 
for essential materials and thus ever more pressure on supplying centers and on our fragile 
biosphere. In an age of great power rivalry the predicted scarcity of our cherished resources 
will certainly mean a degradation of our world’s already unstable environment, as relations 
between suppliers and consumers become ever more tensed and antagonized - if not openly 
militarized. South America, an area at the time blessed and yet simultaneously cursed by the 
abundance of key natural resources indispensable to our societies, and will not escape such 
bleak scenario.  
 In this context, the fear of extra-regional interference in the coming decades has 
intensified across South America fueling the emergence of antagonistic discourses aiming at 
the protection of natural resources from the prospects of foreign appetite. Such practices have 
inevitably echoed on a broader regional level, this time originating from the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR): “[there is] growing consensus within UNASUR that regional 
cooperation is necessary as a means to guarantee the defence of strategic natural 
resources” (Nolte & Whener, 2013, 183). 
 There is in reality no clear evidence of such consensus on a defensive level. UNASUR 
comprises of a diverse kind members, these having diverging interests and different 
perception of the extra-regional environment. As such, even though the organization has 
proven to be rather productive on cooperative security levels, the region has yet to develop a 
common defense strategy: “for most analysts, the main objective of UNASUR is not common 
defense, but security” (Nolte & Whener 2013, 181). Reality seems to make no sense of such 
consensus, rather showing a region greatly attached to the mythical figure of the nation-state 
and its divine territorial integrity, hence thoroughly polarized on the issue of natural resources 
and ever more fragmented on the question of their regional protection. 
 The aim of this paper is therefore to understand underlying reasons and through which 
apparatuses UNASUR constructs its discourse regarding the need to securitize natural 
resources, this, in an aim to generate consent on the need of a common regional strategy. As 
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such, our objective here is not to assess whether one may or may not categorically identify an 
objective threat to the region’s natural resources and stability. Rather we aim at understanding 
how UNASUR uses a context to construct a discourse for specific political purposes. 
Furthermore, and in line with the idea that “the creation of regional governance structures is 
accompanied by strategic discourses that frame a region and create a distinct regional 
identity” (Weiffen et al, 383), we argue that UNASUR, through the construction of the 
discourse, seeks to trigger regional cohesion behind a common defense strategy in a way to a) 
resist a perceived external aggressor, b) reinforce its international agency as an autonomous 
actor c) secure its future by increasing it political capital. By constructing an alarming 
environment marked by the perception of an imminent extra-regional interference, UNASUR 
wishes to win its members consent, its audience, in order to impulse a transition in its practice 
of Regional Governance, that is from cooperative security to collective defense. In this sense, 
our cover now blown away, we shall be giving special notice to a constructivist approach by 
notably emphasizing the importance of the ideational over the material in the push for 
regionalism. 
 The focus will be given to the years of 2011-2014, these corresponding to the years of 
two separate Secretary Generals: María Emma Mejia Velez (2011-2012) and Ali Rodriguez 
Araque (2012-2014). These years are seen as particularly relevant for our study since they 
also correspond to the end of the so called commodity boom, years during which South 
American ambitions for international projection were at their utmost, translating into a clear 
and unambiguous discourse calling for the protection of natural resources.  
 In order to do, the paper is structured as such: first, a theoretical framework through 
which will synthesize the concepts crucial for the understanding of the problematic; secondly, 
a contextual framework in which are described the facilitating conditions to the securitization 
of natural resources; finally, a discursive analysis through which we identify the main themes 
conveyed in UNASUR’s discourse followed by a brief discussion of the intended effects. 
Naturally, the methodology used here will be that of Securitization Theory as outlined by the 
Copenhagen School. It states that securitization is constructed through discursive means and 
is therefore a relevant tool to the understanding of UNASUR’s attitude.  
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2 - Theoretical Framework 
 The following section will be dedicated to the theoretical rooting necessary for our 
analysis. The chapter will be divided into four parts corresponding to the four main 
conceptual axes used across this paper: Regional Security Governance; Post Hegemonic 
Regionalism, Norm Subsidiarity, Securitization Theory and finally Environmental Security. 
These concepts cover a wide range of topics meaning that they will need to be subdivided, 
accordingly, into different subparts corresponding to their various components and the literary 
debate surrounding them. 
2.1 - Regional Security Governance: Cooperative Security, Collective Security 
and Collective Defense? 
 Regional Governance may cover a wide range of themes. In practice however, two 
axes pursued by regional arrangements seem to prevail: economic and security governance. 
Their interdependent nature makes these further important in the aim of any regional 
arrangement: to reach for stability and, ultimately, regional prosperity. Any aims at stabilizing 
a region’s security environment will however presuppose basic forms of economic 
cooperation; while economic cooperation and, ideally, economic prosperity will logically 
presuppose a stable regional environment, free of high level conflicts (Nolte & Whener 2013, 
179). Bringing us to the dilemma: which of the latter aspect must one pursue? Economic or 
Security Governance?  
 South America is a rich example of such dilemma. The region’s governments have 
pursued regionalism through these two main axes: economic or political (mainly defense and 
security orientated) regional governance. There have been over the years numerous attempts 
at creating viable economic cooperation and integration arrangements through notably old and 
new regionalist approaches (Ibid. 179). These have however been rather limited in depth due 
to the lack of continuity in a region marked by chronic political and economic volatility. The 
region has also witnessed alternative approaches to (sub)regional cooperation and integration: 
not merely economic and trade but politically oriented, seeking to deepen cooperation in the 
realms of alternative sector - such as security and defense (Ibid.179). This section deals with 
the theme of (sub)regional security governance. The region has seen a mix of cooperative and 
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collective security; and collective defense arrangements, it it thus crucial to understand these 
in order to thoroughly understand UNASUR’s current approach. 
 Put simply, Regional Security Governance may be conceptualized as “the overall 
configuration of regional organizations that shape the regional security discourse of the 
member states and generate norms and rules for the region, which then contribute to the 
resolution of collective security problems or the realization of common security 
benefits” (Nolte & Whenever, 2013: 178). Approaches to Regional Security Governance, 
leading to subsequent regional security coalitions, may emergence in response or according to 
various variables. These may evolve depending on the “stages in the regionalization 
process” (Serbin & Serbin Pont, 127) - the depth of the project - besides from the perception 
of the challenge the arrangement faces, that is whether it may be seen as originating from the 
outside or from inside the regional domain (Weiffen et al, 377) - or depending upon whether 
the challenge is perceived as a threat or merely a risk for the political body . In this context, 1
three main variants of security coalitions may be identified : collective defense, collective 2
security and cooperative security (377). In the case of Latin America it is noteworthy that 
such variants may not be as easily distinguishable as these may be intertwined - that is “the 
three security conceptions are not mutually exclusive; institutions might combine a variety of 
instruments in line with either of them.” (377), a situation reflected in UNASUR’s approach 
to cooperation in security and defense.  
 Collective defense arrangements emerge in response to the perception of an imminent 
outside threat, rather than simply a risk. These arrangements act to limit the threat’s impact on 
the domain and thus deter, refrain these from threatening the community’s interests (377) - 
through material and normative means (Battaglino, 94). This arrangement thus presupposes a 
relatively stable regional security environment, relatively politically homogenous, unmarked 
by acute internal conflicts in combination with a relatively institutionalized, centralized 
 The difference between a risk and a threat is crucial to the understanding of Regional Security Governance: “A 1
threat exists if a state or group of states perceives another state as having contradictory interests or as an 
adversarial actor that has a bellicose intention, that is, is carrying out plans to attack, and that possesses the 
means, that is, military capability, to inflict considerable damage, whereas a risk is the probability of a future loss 
or damage that can be influenced by current action” (Weiffen et al, 377). 
 It may be relevant to note here that there is on this matter a “scarcity of current Latin American literature on 2
regional governance, and particularly on regional security governance” (Serbin & Serbin Pont, 131). Our study 
aims at contributing to the scarcity. 
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organization, and the presence of basic consensus with regards to common defense policies 
and cooperation.  
 Similarly, yet nonetheless of a diverging nature, the second variant - collective security 
arrangements - emerge in the face of an inside threat (Weiffen et al, 378) - that is the prospect 
of an intensive conflicts. It acts by refraining regional interstate conflicts from undermining 
regional stability by punishing the belligerent parti through institutional, normative 
mechanisms conveyed and set up by the organization (377). In other words, a collective 
security arrangement “primarily maintains order among member states, contains and 
integrates potential aggressors into the institution’s system of norms and rules, and punishes 
noncompliance. The scope of applicable measures for conflict resolution among members 
ranges from peaceful dispute settlement to collective enforcement” (377). This scenario thus 
presupposes a rather strong institutional background again, able to enforce such measures as 
normative coercion, and a relatively safe extra regional background. 
 While these two previous arrangements arise in response to manifest threats, the third 
variant - cooperative security - emerges in response to risks as opposed to clear threats 
stemming from inside and/or outside of the bloc - risks that may possibly undermine a 
region’s peaceful and stable environment (Weiffen et al, 377). The absence of manifest threats 
implies a rather weak regional institutional background and subsequent limited material 
mechanisms to deal with the issue - in contrast to those found in the previous arrangements - 
as not apparent existential threat is important enough to spur a strong cohesive regional 
response coordinated through institutional means. The ideational feature is however firmly 
present and is in this sense the vector through which the coalition may deal with a given 
inside or extra regional risk. Indeed, “cooperative security arrangements aim at the promotion 
of peaceful change based on the construction of shared norms, rules and procedures and rely 
on information exchange, transparency, communication and socialization” (Weiffen et al, 
377). Thus, a regional coalition may wish to intergovernmentally stabilize a region by 
increasing the trust environment thereby, removing risks of conflicts in the area which would 
otherwise undermine any other developments in a given regional project (whether economic 
or merely political). In practice, a regional arrangement inclined to the practice of regional 
security governance through cooperative security will rely on various mechanisms to mitigate 
regional conflicts and patterns of mistrust by changing notably the perceptions and attitudes 
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of regional actors through by increasing the general confidence level. This may be achieved 
through so called Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), acting as to “convey non hostile 
intentions” and “reduce excessive fear and suspicions” (Serbin & Pont, 2015, 128). These 
forms are not mutually excluding and necessarily separate. In this case of UNASUR for 
example, we see a combination of collective and cooperative approaches to security, and yet 
no evidence of the use of collective defense (Weiffen et al, 378). 
 The varying conceptual approaches presented above - collective defense, collective 
security cooperative security - illustrate the material and practical illustration of Regional 
Security Governance. Material aspects are yet only one side of some bigger picture. Indeed, 
on a larger level, regionalism is founded both on material and ideational bases (Battaglino, 
2012). In the case of South American security governance, the so-called ideational aspect may 
be of particular significance - possibly of a greater importance for the completion of 
regionalist projects. In fact, Battaglino (2012) notes that “although material and ideational 
factors are necessary conditions for the formation of regionalism, the ideational dimension in 
particular has been especially relevant and novel since it is the first time in South America 
that countries conceive defense issues in regional terms, to protect and advance new 
solidarities and collective management of regional problems.” (84). Mere material capabilities 
of any given regional projects seem rather problematic to complete if not accompanied by 
discursive, identity orientated practices: “The creation of regional governance structures is 
accompanied by strategic discourses that frame a region and create a distinct regional 
identity”  (Weiffen et al, 2013, 383).  The following part seeks to understand such ideational 
aspects necessary to any regionalistic movement through the concepts of post hegemonic 
regionalism and more precisely Acharya’s conceptualization of Norm Subsidiarity. 
2.2 - Post-Hegemonic Regionalism 
 New regional arrangements have risen in South America seeking to formulate 
autonomous approaches to regional cooperation deviant from those proposed by former 
experiences. These are motivated by aspirations of “redefining new geographical and 
ideological boundaries while fostering new consensuses that are defined regionally, not 
globally, and supported by the mainly state-led practices, institutions and funding mechanisms 
in new social fields such as education, health, employment, energy, infrastructure and 
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security” (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 6). These autonomous formulations may be understood 
through the framework of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). In order 
for one to fully understand its rise in South America, one must take into account its historical 
rooting. 
 There have been various waves of regional integrative attempts in Latin America since 
the post colonial era each having approached cooperation from specific axes, as stated 
previously. Many of these have however been aiming at cooperation through economic 
channels yet through different approaches. As such, emerging in the 1950s until the 1970s, so-
called Old (or Closed) Regionalism aimed at breaking inherent relations of dependency to an 
industrialized core sustained since the colonial era through notably structuralist and 
protectionist measures. Old Regionalism thus corresponds to a “manifestation of regionalized 
forms of regulated markets and high tariffs” (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 7).  
 In contrast, New Regionalism (also known as “Open” Regionalism) emerged in the 
1990s, in response to the apparent failures of the form. It held a rather globalist approach 
thoroughly diverging from the latter by aiming at, inter alias, “the transnationalization of trade 
and production, and the progressive liberalization of markets in developing 
countries” (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 7) - in line with the general liberalization wave the region 
went through in that period. In this context, New Regionalism provided and served states’ 
objectives to “lock in market reforms of the Washington Consensus on a regional scale” (8). 
Such strategy highlights the rather dependent character of the New Regionalism Approach 
(NRA) in Latin America, an approach serving the principles of a hegemonic ““meta-
narrative” (17). In sum, the NRA, in contrast to its predecessor, saw regionalism very much as 
a catalyzer for globalization rather than a means to defeat it. 
 Yet, The NRA fails to understand the rise of newly formed organization of deviant 
nature such as ALBA, UNASUR, having adopted diverging interpretations of the meaning 
and practices of regionalism: these going against perceived hegemonic forms of regionalism, 
seeking autonomy on multiple levels, illustrating a regional will committed to the “rejection 
of external oversight” (Rigirozzi & Tussie, 1). In a time of partial US regional oversight due 
to its post 9/11 reorientation, these organization have sought to move beyond trade led paths 
to integration, focusing rather on normative and ideational aspects captured by the idea of 
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regional identity in a general objective to autonomously set their own regional governance 
agenda (Ibid, 1).  
 In sum, Post Hegemonic Regionalism in South America encompasses “regional 
structures characterized by hybrid practices as a result of a partial displacement of dominant 
forms of US-led neoliberal governance in the acknowledgement of other political forms of 
organization and economic management of regional (common) goods.” (2).  
 One may thus point to the dualistic essence of Post Hegemonic Regionalism - an 
approach to regionalism combining material and ideational aspects. On the one hand, it is in 
line with its preceding Old and New regionalist approaches characterized by their inherent 
material orientation to integration (illustrated in this case by economic and social exchange) - 
while thoroughly diverging from the NRA as challenging the imposed U.S neoliberal meta-
narrative. On the other hand, it is an approach characterized by an ideational focus, playing 
the role of a foundations for the material aspects (Riggirozzi, Tussie, 5).  
 This ideational emphasis is quite explicit in UNASUR’s approach to Defense and 
Security Regional Governance. It is used, according to Battaglino (2012), in a challenging 
manner, challenging the western security agenda. It seeks to formulate alternative defense and 
security approaches. He coins such attitude as being the illustration of the organization’s 
normative dissidence (95). While the material aspects seen previously (Regional Security 
Governance) may aim at limiting extra regional material intervention, normative channels 
may be used in a manner to limit extra regional normative influence by notably reinforcing 
the sense of belonging and trust in a central regional institution.  
2.3 - Norm Subsidiarity 
 The concept of Norm Subsidiarity may help us in this sense to further grasp 
UNASUR’s use of Normative Dissidence as a means for securing the region’s autonomy as an 
independent actor. The concept is furthermore important for our discursive analysis as it 
enable us to understand the meaning of the norms shaped and constructed through discursive 
means by UNASUR actors. First introduced by Acharya (2011), Norm Subsidiarity “concerns 
the process whereby local actors create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from 
dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors” (95).  
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 Acharya identifies two major causes that seem to have motivated weaker states to 
practice Normative Subsidiarity. First, their exclusion from the “global norm-making 
processes” (100). Higher rank institutions conceived by international powers do not 
necessarily reflect the identities and norms of relatively feeble states (100), Norm Subsidiarity 
plays in this sense the role of challenging such institutionalized normative “tyranny” (100). 
Secondly, the concept of Norm Subsidiarity also applied to states wishing to confront great 
powers’ chronic violation of their own norms, such as non-intervention, and the inability of 
higher institutions meant to refrain from these violations thereby leading to the coining of the 
term “Organized Hypocrisy” by Krasner (1999): “this occurred when they see the violation of 
their cherished global norms by powerful actors and when higher level institutions tasked 
with their defense seem unwilling or incapable of preventing their violation.” (Acharya, 100).  
 Correspondingly to these causes, Acharya identifies two main effects Norm 
Subsidiarity may lead to. First comes the “challenging/resisting effect” (Acharaya, 101). 
Weaker actors, through Norm Subsidiarity, wish to resist stronger actors, extra regional 
powers and the high rank institutions they supposedly control (102). In parallel to this action, 
local actors will formulate their own norms and rules yet outside of the influence of any 
higher authority (102). Norms are thus used here as “weapon for the weak” (119), used in a 
way to compensate for actors “lacking in structural and material power” to resist foreign 
interference (119).  
 Besides from this first effect, a second effect is identified by Acharya: “the supportive ⁄ 
strengthening effect of subsidiarity” (102). This relates to the manner whereby local actors 
construct norms by “invoking and supporting a global normative prior to secure their 
autonomy and resist powerful actors” (102). In this sense, local actors, for example in times of 
recent independence or simply in times external interference (whether normatively or 
materially), seek to secure their autonomy by emphasizing globally accepted norms and 
principles, thereby delegitimizing any attempt by a foreign actor to bypass this principle - and 
to ultimately deter the latter. 
 In sum, Post Hegemonic Regionalism captures the recent emergence of alternative 
Regionalist arrangements - coalitions wishing to challenge previous Open Regionalist 
formulations, perceived as inherently hegemonic, wishing for increased autonomy on various 
levels. This in particular is done through normative and ideational channels leading to 
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regional and normative dissidence towards great powers and higher ranking institutions, 
perceived as threatening. Norm Subsidiarity is a set of norms, “a weapon of the weak” (119), 
by which weaker countries may resist, or rather seek support from the international 
community in order to access or protect their autonomy in face of marginalization or great 
power hypocrisy.  
 We know that the “desire to protect regional norms and practices from external 
influence is an important factor shaping UNASUR’s conception of security” (Whener & 
Notle, 2013, 182). It is thus of no surprise that Acharya’s perspective has much “value for 
understanding the conception of security within UNASUR and SDC, which can be interpreted 
as a means for guaranteeing South American autonomy and as a strategy for balancing against 
the US” (181). Furthermore, we know that “the creation of regional governance structures is 
accompanied by strategic discourses that frame a region and create a distinct regional 
identity”  (Weiffen et al, 383). How these discourse are constructed, and subsequently manage 
to channel and legitimize norms, may be understood through Securitization Theory, and 
notably the analytical framework outlined the Copenhagen School.  
2.4 - Securitization Theory 
 The end of the Cold War marked the commencement of a period of significant 
analytical innovation and structural modernization in the field of Security Studies. Among 
others, The Copenhagen School (hereupon “CS”) played a prominent role in such transitional 
period with its refreshing constructivist insights. It’s innovativeness sparked the beginning of 
a transition from a field previously marked by a monopoly of traditional, realist, neorealist 
approaches towards more constructivist, and critically orientated paths. While the classical 
approach was characterized as ‘narrow’ - that is, composed of a quintessentially state 
militarily centric view of security (Buzan et al, 1998, 37) - the Copenhagen school, sought to 
widen the insights of security studies and thus expand security agendas to include economic, 
societal and environmental matters (22).  
 The resulting analytical framework, as formally set up by Buzan et al. (1998), not only 
sought to expand to additional sectors, it drastically re-conceptualized the concept of security 
itself. In accordance to constructivist principles (which contradicted the former classical 
approaches that firmly believed in the objectivity of threats - the idea that threats were “real” 
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and securitization in response was thus legitimate and rational), the CS believed that security 
was merely a sociological and intersubjective construction - meaning nor veritably subjective 
or objective. To state that security is essentially constructed is to say that it is no more than “a 
self referential practice, because it is in the practice that the issue becomes a security - not 
necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a 
threat” (Buzan et al. 24). A threat, according to the CS, is constructed through a specific 
formula combining various components. In order for a matter to be intersubjectively 
constructed, that is reach the level of the security sphere, an actor must first present the object 
that is to be protected (the referential object) (36) and by whom or what (the existential threat) 
(36). 
 Such discourse, according to the CS, is constructed through discursive means and 
notably what is referred to as a “speech act” (Weaver, 55). The CS, based on the writing of 
Austin (1975), inter alia, believes in the inherent “performativity” of speech - that, “by saying 
something, something is done” (Buzan et al. 26). That is to say that, by saying security and by 
pointing at a specific perceived threat through linguistic means, what an actor really does is 
“make” security where there is not inherent need for it. The effect this will have on an 
audience is described as being quasi magical by Bourdieu (1984) “The power of constituting 
the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming and 
transforming the vision of the world, and, thereby, action on the world itself, an almost 
magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is attained through 
(material) force” (170). If constructed effectively, enunciated in a favorable context, the 
matter will have to echo within the political sphere and be accepted by a given audience (21). 
As such, a matter may not be effectively securitized without prior acceptance by an audience, 
its cruciality in this sense led to the idea of the “empowering audience” (Balzacq, 2011, 40). 
  An audience is a group of people that empower the actor by accepting his discourse 
and validating it thereby giving him access to special measures to deal with the enunciated 
threat (Buzan et al, 26), thus finalizing the securitization of the matter. In this sense security 
“is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency 
sufficient to have substantial political effects” (25); saliency is met when properly performed 
by an actor through a speech act which in turn convinces an audience.  
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 In sum, a successful process leading to subsequent securitization will only be met in a 
situation where an actor presents a referential object as existentially threatened through 
discursive means, leading to its “discursive legitimation” (Watts, 105), is subsequently 
accepted by an audience and thus staging the matter from a non politicized, to politicized and 
finally securitized stage which allows for the use of exceptional measures: “the breaking of 
otherwise binding rules and governance by decrees rather than by democratic 
decisions” (Trombetta, 2008, 588), effectively escaping these in order to effectively deal with 
the issue (Buzan et al, 1998: 26). 
 This breaking of the rules is problematic in the eyes of CS. It holds a critical stance 
towards such instances, as it sees securitization as something rather negative with dangerous 
and “problematic consequences” (Trombetta, 2008, 589). Indeed, the transposition of an issue 
from the realm of normal politics, to the extreme level of security - giving the securitizing 
actor the possibility to use emergency measures with regards to the threat - is seen as 
particularly dangerous by the School (29) - the danger of its normalization and rationalization, 
being engrained and escaping any kind of inquiry with regards to the value of these measures. 
More than a mere danger, securitization is seen as a failure: “Our belief […] is not “the more 
security the better” […] security should be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as 
normal politics. Ideally, politics should be able to unfold according to routine procedures 
without this extraordinary elevation of specific threats to a pre political immediacy.” (Buzan 
et al. 29). In this context, Weaver prescribes “less security, more politics!’ (Waever 1995: 56). 
2.5 - Securitizing the Environment 
 As enunciated abvoe, the CS has reformulated the classical security conceptualization 
as not being solely linked to the state and a purely military centric affair (Simpson 277), but 
may be expanded and widened to include additional sectors: the economic, the societal, the 
political and environmental sectors (Buzan et al 1998). The purpose of this section is to 
understand the main discourses and perspective constituting the realm environmental security. 
 Environmental security may be defined as the “protection from environmental 
dangers, the lack/depletion of strategic resources and conflict over these resources” (Koff, 
666). Academically however, environmental security studies is a rather vague conceptual 
paradigm, as it includes a wide range of different topics and variety of diverging and even 
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contradictory perspectives (Simpson, 279), ranging from rather pessimistic and fatalist tales to 
rater positive ones. As such, and according to Floyd & Matthew (2013), one may identify 
seven main competing perspectives, each approaching Environmental Security from different 
angles: 1) The so called ‘Toronto group ’, advocating of the Resource Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict Thesis; 2) environmental abundance, in line with the resource curse thesis; 3) 
political ecology 4) ecological security 5) Human Security 6) Feminist environmental security 
7) Peace-building theories, in line with the rather positive implications of securitizing the 
environments (26). By means of synthesis and relevance for our study, only the Toronto 
group’s approach and, in contrast, the peace building and cooperative approach to 
Environmental Security will be developed.  
 Environmental Security has been raised since the 1970s as a central matter of interest 
by numerous high ranking regional and multilateral political bodies such as the European 
Union and the United Nations (Maas et al, 122). These have sought to deal with the issue of 
environmental degradation and climate change through the adoption of rather catastrophic 
discourses. One may refer for example to the designation of environmental degradation, by 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, as a central factor in various recent armed intrastate 
conflicts such as in Darfur (122).  
 These rather catastrophic ideas seem to echo the fatalistic predilections enunciated by 
the Toronto Group - led by Homer Dixon (1999) - and the more extreme ideas of Kaplan 
(1994). These, to varying degrees, have contributed to the establishment of the Resource 
Scarcity and Violent Conflict Thesis. Homer-Dixon (1999) has stated that environmental 
degradation, and in particular the depletion of natural resources, was to be indirectly linked to 
the emergence of intrastate conflict as these would have “deleterious social consequences” 
and thus unbalance intrastate stability (Floyd & Matthews, 26). Homer-Dixon, sees resource 
scarcity and subsequent conflicts as arising from three different sources: “from a real decrease 
in the supply of a resource (for example, clear-cutting a forest); from an increase in demand 
due mainly to population growth or changes in consumption patterns; or from structural 
factors (for example, through the privatization of a resource such as water)” (26).  
 Surprisingly, Homer-Dixon’s approach corresponds to the more diluted premises of 
the Resource Scarcity and Violent Conflict Thesis. Kaplan, formulates such thesis more 
radically pushing the catastrophic discourse even further. In his article The Coming Anarchy 
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(1994), Kaplan assures that environmental degradation will be playing a central role in the 
emergence of intrastate and interstate upheaval leading to international instability and 
ultimately complete anarchy. His disastrous predilections are believed to have had such 
impact that they led to Clinton’s inclusion of Environmental Security within his foreign 
agenda, and thus to its securitization (Trombetta, 2008, 139).   
 As stated previously, the Copenhagen School warns against securitization as it sees it 
as a failure to effectively deal with the issue through normal political channels. In this line of 
thought, Duffy (2014) finds that, “90 per cent of the major armed conflicts between 1950 and 
2000 occurred within countries containing biodiversity hotspots, and more than 80 per cent 
took place directly within hotspot areas” (820). In this context, Duffy warns against the role of 
biodiversity, and in particular that of its conservation, as taking too much of a central role in 
conflicts, thereby warning against the dangerous and counterproductive “militarization of 
conservation” (820). In line with these ideas, Deudney (1999), a fierce critique of securitizing 
the environment, warns against the recent rise of nationalistic approaches aiming at protecting 
national environments in order to protect the national environment (466–468): “that the term 
‘security’ evokes a set of confrontational practices associated with the state and the military 
which should be kept apart from the environmental debate” (Trombetta, 586).  
 In contrast to these views others see environmental security as a positive practice, in 
particular as a vector for international cooperation (Trombetta, 2008), regional cooperation 
(Koff, 2016) and peace building (Maas et al. 2013). These points of view seem to contradict 
the CS’s depiction of security as an ultimately negative approach, and a failure. Trombetta 
(2008), in particular, seems skeptic towards the CS’s “antagonistic” and “confrontational” 
understanding of security (585, 589). She sees it rather as conceptualization directly derived 
from Schmittian understandings of security, conveying the idea that “the logic of security is 
the logic of war” (589). Trombetta goes further by warning that such views may very well 
lead to the marginalization and general depoliticization of the environment (589), thus leading 
to an ineffective policy in spite of the apparent urgency of for example climate change - as 
states, in accordance to the CS logic, seek to distance themselves from security which, in the 
eyes of CS, may lead to confrontation.  
 Following Trombetta’s views, and in direct contradiction with the CS’s 
conceptualization of security, some have thus pointed at the positiveness implicated in the 
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securitization of the environment, that environmental security may be an effective platform 
for international and regional cooperation and even peacebuilding (Maas et al. 122), believing 
that environmental security is essentially “all about solidarity” (Thompson, 137), and ““a tool 
for peace-building and conflict management” (Maas et al. 134), a platform for dialogue.  
3 - Contextual Framework: Facilitating Conditions 
 We recall that a securitization process requires a different set of variables: an actor, a 
referential object and facilitating conditions (Buzan et al, 36). The aim of this chapter is to 
differentiate these components in relation to UNASUR’s attempt to securitize South American 
resources and understand to a larger extent the contextual premises through which the 
discourse attempting to do so is built on.  
  A first section will be dedicated to the structural understanding of the main actor from 
which the discourse emanates - that being UNASUR. As such we will analyze how it 
approaches Regional Security Governance, through which institution (SDC), and through 
which conceptual framework (cooperative and multidimensional security) - thus linking 
practice to our previous theoretical framework.   
 A second section will be dedicated to the referent object involved in the securitizing 
move - this being strategic natural resources. As such we shall show how these are seen as 
crucial for South America states, taken into account the global context and the general 
increased demand for natural resources. While these may be portrayed as vectors for regional 
cooperation, they may also be seen as a having a polarizing effect on the region and its 
stability. Energy in particular has great economic and developmental implications and are thus 
chronically instrumentalized by various governments for political purposes - while such 
politicization adds to the general patterns of fragmentation. Subsequently, regional efforts to 
set up common strategies seem rather obsolete in the face of a fragmented environment. The 
lack of regional effort is yet another cause to UNASUR’s attempt to securitize natural 
resources in South America.  
 A final section will be related to the US security policy in the region - this 
corresponding very much as the main facilitating condition to the securitization of natural 
resources. Such policy has been characterized as being increasingly antagonistic and 
militarized (Battaglino, 2012) and thus a cause for the need of a collective defense strategies. 
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Yet, and similarly to energy, such common efforts have been rather obsolete thereby laying 
ground for yet another justification on which the discourse seems to build on - the region’s 
structural and institutional vulnerability towards an extra-regional aggressor, a point further 
underlined when taken into account the issue of natural resources.  
3.1 - UNASUR and the Practice of Regional Security Governance.  
 The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is an intergovernmental regional 
organization comprising of 12 members - all located in South America. It emerges in Cuzco in 
2004, initially under the name the South American Community of Nations (CSN), then 
renamed Union of South American Nations in 2008 at the occasion of the signatory of its 
Constitutive Treaty, in Brasilia (Nolte and Whener, 2013, 179). The organization consists of 
various institutions among which a couple may be identified as key. First, the council of 
Heads of States, illustrating the intergovernmental essence of formation, is a platform through 
which Heads of States meet annually (179), in addition to a pro-tempore presidency exercised 
in turn each year by each member states (179). The function of legal responsibility and the 
representation of the organization is captured by the Secretary General whom is appointed by 
the council of Heads of States. In parallel to these come 12 councils each dedicated to key 
regional themes - ranging from heath, technology, to infrastructure (179). Among these stands 
out one council in particular: the South American Defense Council (SDC/CDS) (Abedrapo, 
15). 
 This particular dynamism is of no surprise since the organization is often 
characterized, in contrast to other organizations in the region, as being essentially orientated 
towards the matter of defense and security cooperation: “defense and security issues occupy a 
privileged space in UNASUR’s program and practices” (Nolte and Whener 2013, 179). 
Within this framework, the South American Defense Council (SDC hereupon), seen as the 
most dynamic of UNASUR’s councils, is the institutional arm though which the organization 
seeks to exercise and determine its strategy towards regional security governance.  
 The context for its emergence, or rather the causes that led to its creation are found in 
its main objective of “consolidating South America as a peaceful region” (Sanahuja, Escasez, 
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497; Battaglino, 82; Nolte and Whener, 2013, 179) . The council was created in 2008 with the 3
impulse of Brazil in response to the conflict between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
whereby Colombia is believed to have trespassed Ecuador’s sovereignty by intruding into the 
country in a mission aiming at subverting FARC settlements based in Ecuador (Sanahuja & 
Escanez, 2014, 496). The action was naturally met with considerable criticism from South 
American states thereby prompting the idea for the need of a cooperative approach to regional 
security; one capable of avoiding such risks which may lead to yet other conflicts and thus 
insuring regional stability and cohesion on security matters - in other words the need for the 
creation of a SDC.  
 It is in this context that UNASUR’s approach to Regional Security Governance, as 
highlighted through the SDC, is firmly inclined towards the concept of Cooperative Security 
(497). The concept, as seen previously, seeks to avoid security risks emanating from the inside 
of a regional community that could undermine stability by notably using various instruments 
and tools used in a way to enhance trust between regional players. This may be done through 
so-called Confidence - Security - Building Measures (CSBM), which include a range of 
policies such as increased transparency in the matters of military spending, cooperative 
stances towards military training and the set up of joint missions (Serbin & Pont, 2015, 128).  
 It is clear that UNASUR explicitly embraces such concept. Since its creation various 
policies have been formulated and applied in an aim to effectively “reduce uncertainty and 
enhance a peaceful environment.” (Weiffen et al, 2013, 380). As such “it attempts to gradually 
progress in the analysis and discussion of the common elements of a joint view on defense 
matters; to promote the exchange of information; to contribute to the articulation of regional 
joint positions at multilateral defense forums; to strengthen the adoption of confidence-
building measures (CBMs); to encourage the exchange of information on military education 
and training” (Nolte and Whener, 2013, 179).  
 Most rivalries, such as the one involving Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, are 
related to territorial integrity. These are further exacerbated by historical patterns as “most 
rivalries or potential conflict factor may be unresolved border issues that date from the 
colonial times” (Ibid, 177). Border linked conflicts contribute to the general polarization of 
 Its other objectives being “(a) Consolidating South America as a zone of peace; (b) Creating a 3
South American defence identity; and (c) Generating consensus in order to strengthen 
regional defence cooperation”(Battaglino,  82)
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the region, fueling an environment of mistrust (Ibid, 177). As a consequence to these factors, 
the region witnessed for example between 2006 and 2009 a general rise in defense 
expenditures of more than 91% (COHA) - signaling a veritable arms race (Ibid, 181). In this 
context, one of the main policies stemming from the SDC has been to promote more 
transparency in military spendings. This measure was accompanied by the promotion of 
military cooperation between members in the form of joint trainings or joint missions as 
illustrated the humanitarian intervention to Haiti in 2010 led by UNASUR (Abdedrapo, 15). 
 This latter example highlights yet another conceptual indication of UNASUR’s 
specific approach to Regional Security Governance. The wide range of perceived security 
challenges present in the region, whether traditional or non-traditional and differing ostensibly 
depending on the country involved, has led UNASUR to endorse Multidimensional security 
(Nolte Whener, 2015, 180) - the conceptual framework through which cooperative security is 
applied (Weiffen et al, 380). On a local level, the conceptual framework has therefore allowed 
members for more space with regards to their security policies, allowing the formulation of 
“flexible architecture for each country to define its own security structure” (Serbin, Serbin 
Pont, 130). Members favor such approaches as it leaves them with more space for local 
formulations, as it enables to address security challenges “at different levels and with different 
institutions and instruments” (Nolte and Whener, 2013, 181). On a regional level, and in line 
with the Copenhagen School’s premises, the concept has however enabled the organization to 
expand its security agenda to include non-traditional issues present in the social, economic 
and environmental sectors (Weiffen et al, 378) - leading to their potential securitization and 
militarization (Serbin, Serbin Pont 130). It is thus of no surprise that the issue of natural 
resources, comprised within the sphere of environmental security, and notably that of their 
defense, have been included in the main objectives of the SDC (Sanahuja & Escanez, 497). 
3.2 - Strategic Natural Resources in South America: Power Projection, 
Cohesion, and Fragmentation.  
 A comprehensive appreciation of the current global context and its near future seem to 
point to the general and problematic process of drastic increase in the demand for non 
renewable strategic natural resources while, in parallel, the general decrease in supply - 
referred to as scarcity. It is believed that by 2050 the world human population will reach 
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between 7,800 and 10,000 million people (Forti, 6). Such demographic growth, combined 
with the progressive enriching of these populations, will naturally lead to great rises in the 
demand for basic commodities. As such, the global demand for water is believed to hit an 
increase of more than 55% by 2050 (6). It is therefore understandable that, in such context, 
the global water supplies will be under great pressure subsequently leading to a situation 
whereby, by that same year, 40% of the human population will be living in areas marked by 
grave water issues (Forti, 6). Additionally to these come other basic materials and energies 
crucial for our environment, our industries, our economies. In relation to South America, 
Sanahuja & Escanez (2014) note that “el siglo XXI estará caracterizado por la escasez, y en el 
que una de las principales amenazas de la región, por ser rica en recursos, estará relacionada 
con un intento de control foráneo sobre el petróleo, el agua, y los recursos minerales y/o 
agroalimentarios y que por ello podrían ser objeto de conflictos” (505). In this context, it is 
indisputable that South American will be be playing a central role in this near future scenario, 
a center for the global supply of these later materials - seen the considerable amount of these 
natural resources the region bears.  
 First, the region is key energy wise. It is believed to hold more than 19,5% of 
uncovered global reserves of oil, representing more than 9,2% of the global oil production in 
2011 (Forti, 6) - these being mostly concentrated in Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and notably 
Brazil and the recent exploitation of its offshore reserves (Singh, 457). Besides from oil, the 
region has considerable natural gas reserves, these being mostly concentrated in the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN) (Singh, 457). In addition to energy, he region holds multiple 
other rare materials such as 41,6% of total silver (Forti, 6), huge amounts of Lithium (90% of 
the total world reserves being concentrated in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile (6)), the biggest 
reserves of Niobium - 98,4% of these are located in Brazil (6) and 42% of the world’s total 
reserves of Copper (6). Besides from these rare materials, the region bears materials perhaps 
more crucial for the sake of our environment and ultimately our survival: as such 28,9 % of 
the world’s total water reserves (6), in addition to the biggest biodiversity reserves - mostly in 
the hands of Brazil, Colombia, Equator , Peru and Venezuela (6).  
 The relation between regional cooperation and natural resources in South America, 
and energy in particular, are however of a rather dualistic and paradoxical nature - as having a 
“doble cara” (Bodemer, 180). Related to regionalism, energy may be seen in the one hand as 
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“una oportunidad para avanzar en materia de cooperación e integración regional, similar a la 
experiencia europea en la década de 1950; o bien como una peligrosa fuente de conflictos 
entre los países de la región.” (Bodemer, 180). Some believe that these resources have 
provided the region with more economic weight, translating into more international political 
bargaining power (Bruckman, 2011) - and thus to a stronger and cohesive region on the 
whole. Others paint a reality of yet another picture: a region driven by conflictual patterns 
fueled by the politicization of energy (Singh, 458), and its securitization (Nolte & Wehner, 
2015, 40). The instrumentalization of energy by countries for political reasons and for power 
projection and regional interests of leadership (namely Bolivia or Venezuela) (Bodemer, 179) 
has led to a polarized and fragmented environment whilst ultimately undermining any real 
aspirations at establishing common regional energy strategies (Singh, 457).  
 These patterns may indeed be driven by natural resources, and in this case energy, yet 
these are mostly due to their asymmetrical distribution across the region. In response, there 
have been multiple attempts since the 1970s to push for regional energy cooperation on the 
grounds that coordinating between producing and consuming countries would lead to energy 
security and thus regional stability (Bodemer, 179). On a security level, cooperation would 
theoretically be beneficial for the region as it would mean increased protection for its 
resources, increased stability and thus added credibility and political power on the global 
stage. The emergence of various recent initiatives in particular highlight the revived interest of 
South American nations to dispose of these conflictual patterns regardless of the above 
described fragmentation (179). These attempts include for example the Initiative for the 
Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), pursued under 
UNASUR’s umbrella, which has sought to link different parts of the region through various 
ambitious trans-regional projects (Riggorizi, Tussie, 2012). To this initiative may be added, 
and to a larger regional scope, the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) (Bodemer, 
179). Finally, and perhaps more relevant for this study was the hope brought by the Isla 
Margarita Summit. The summit, initiated by Venezuela in 2007 and in the general framework 
of UNASUR and regarded by Hugo Chavez as nothing more than a “rewriting the South 
American history” (Singh, 463). 
 However such attempts remain mere attempts with no veritable foundations as these 
have been limited, mainly programatic with no real practical manifestation. With regards to 
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the Margarita Summit, Singh (s) states for example that “nothing concrete emerged from the 
Margarita energy summit on the substantial issues of regional energy security. The logic of 
regional energy security was well acknowledged, yet the lines on which the participating 
leaders approached to evolve a collective strategy were off the tangent” (468). The summit 
was set up as a platform through which members sought to put forward their own interest and 
notably Venezuela being prominent producer and exporter. The summit only served as an echo 
to the fragmented and sensitive topic of energy in South America, making no real sense of the 
need to build a coherent and collective approach. The failure of reaching regional consensus 
concerning energy and its distribution is rather unfortunate on two levels. First on a financial 
level as the mutual benefits of establishing a common energy strategy in South America could 
help the region save more than $5,000 million per year (Singh, 458). Secondly, further 
fragmentation entails less credibility in the eyes of the international community, as it seems 
not capable to efficiently and responsibly make use of these resources, meaning supposedly 
more vulnerability in the face of a potential extra-regional incursion.  
3.3 - The Role of a US Security Policy Marked by Ambivalence and Ambiguity 
 Following this account, we seek to uncover here the causes that have led to the recent 
emergence of autonomous and endogenous patterns of Regional Security and Defense 
governance in South America, as illustrated in particular with the creation of UNASUR’s 
SDC. With regards to these patterns however “the role of United States (...) must not be 
underestimated” (Serbin & Serbin Pont, 127). More specifically, we seek understand the role 
of the US’s security policy in the apparition of such patterns.  
 The relation is portrayed in an ambivalent manner, if not antithetical. While some see 
the emergence of endogenous regional defensive capabilities as an effect of the US’s gradual 
re-orientation towards the middle east, and thus its distancing from the region (Vilas, 2005; 
Weiffen et al, 2013); others (Battaglino 2012; Bruckmann 2011) see the emergence of the 
SDC as directly caused by the US’s increasingly antagonistic approach to the region: and in 
particular its aggressive and militarized stance driven by its “war on terror” framework.  
 It is often taken for granted that the United States in recent years has tended, security 
policy wise, to distance itself from South America. Such changes in interests are believed to 
be driven by its general “war on terror” following the 9/11 attacks which led the US to focus 
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on other areas of the world such as the Middle East (Villas, 2005 in bataglino). As a result, 
“the region does not stand as a strategic priority to US interests (Battaglino, 86). These 
changes of orientation have meant in turn more autonomy for the region and notably on 
defense and security levels, as illustrated with the creation of UNASUR’s Defense Council 
(SDC) (Serbin, Serbin Pont, 133).  
 Others have yet described another reality. The 9/11 attacks did indeed lead to a change 
in the orientation of the US’s security policy. However, its subsequent “war on terror” has 
rather been since then expanded to other regions, including South America (Battaglino, 2012) 
- as complementary to its “war on drugs”. According to Battaglino (2012) and Bruckmann 
(2011), its expansion to South America has translated into more material presence in the form 
of military troops. This is notably revealed by Battaglino whom points at the increased 
presence of the The Southern Command of the United States (Southcom) (87). In addition he 
points at “the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet (May 2008), which had been deactivated after 
the Second World War and remained under that status even during the Cold War, and the 
attempt to deploy US troops and sophisticated surveillance systems in Colombian bases 
(March 2009)” (87), as yet another clear indicator. Such growth in the presence of the 
Southcom was justified in the following manner: “the policy promoted by the Pentagon 
sustains that US national security was increasingly threatened by those governments in the 
region that failed to exercise control over vast ‘ungoverned spaces’ within their 
borders” (Battaglino 87). In a similar fashion, Bruckmann (2011) states that “entre 2003 y 
2010 ingresaron un total de 87,516 militares estadounidenses, con una permanencia media de 
12 a 67 días por cada ingreso, para realizar ejercicios de entrenamiento militar en mar, suelo y 
ríos; entrenamiento anti-subversivo y de inteligencia en conjunto con las fuerzas armadas y 
policiales del Perú y ejercicios de reconocimiento de terreno en zonas de alto conflicto social” 
(Bruckmann, PAGE?).  
3.4 - Limitations of UNASUR’s defense strategy  
 Such developments have naturally sustained the historical belief that “the US is not 
perceived as a benign hegemon providing stability in the region, especially by the resource 
rich countries, which fear possible US interference or intervention.” (Nolte & Whener, 2013, 
178). In this sense the idea that the region’s autonomy was being threatened prompted the 
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need for the creation of endogenous defensive capabilities: “a reaction to the asymmetry of 
power in the Americas, a strategy of institutional balancing against the United States in order 
to curb its influence, and a means of guaranteeing South American autonomy and self-
organization of defense” (Weiffen et al, 382).  
 In spite of this perceived threat, there is however no real evidence of a common 
regional defensive strategy. While the United States’ regional security policy may be seen as a 
catalyzer for the emergence of the South American Council (SDC), the latter is yet only 
defined paradoxically as solely a security orientated institution rather than one of a collective 
defensive nature. Such characterization applies to UNASUR as a whole: “for most analysts, 
the main objective of UNASUR is not common defence but security” (Notle & Whener, 2013, 
181). The non existence of a common approach towards defense is inherently linked to the 
intergovernmental nature of the organization. Even though the multidimensional approach of 
the organization has enabled members for more space and flexibility in the formulation of 
their security agenda, the framework has also led to the fragmentation of interests: “Within 
this framework [of multidimensional security], it is important to point out that there is no 
common, regional perception on the priority of these new threats. While the countries in the 
region tend to coincide on the priorities regarding drug trafficking and terrorism, the 
prioritization of other threats in the subregional level and national agendas vary from 
subregion to subregion, and also from country to country.” (Serbin, Serbin Pont 130). The 
framework of Multidimensional Security, combined with the overall “weak institutional 
structures” (Koff, 675) characterizing UNASUR, besides from the intra-regional tensions 
arising from border issues and natural resources, have thus led to the paradoxical effect of 
further fragmenting the region on the level of defense strategy rather than effectively bringing 
it together to form a coherent defensive block. This has ultimately sustained South America as 
being a region depicted as a “loosely coupled, if still imperfect, security community” (Weiffen 
et al, 382); and thus too vulnerable in the eyes of the UNASUR.  
 In sum, this chapter chapter was dedicated to the mere contextual premises necessary 
to understand the emergence of any regional securitizing attempts towards South American 
natural resources. These premises taken together - a) the importance of natural resources for 
South American states, b) their polarizing effect on the region entailing no common regional 
approach to their distribution and protection, c) the United States security policy towards the 
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region being depicted as increasingly d) in spite of the highlighted limitations of the SDC, 
revealing to a larger extent the lack of regional consensus on collective defense strategies - 
have laid the path for the emergence of a discourse originating from within UNASUR aiming 
at securitizing natural resources against a perceived extra regional threat. In other words, these 
contextual premises may be interpreted, in line with CS principles, as the facilitating 
conditions playing as catalyzers to the UNASUR discourse regarding its strategic resources. 
4 - Discourse Analysis  
 While the previous chapter was dedicated to the mere contextual premises, the 
facilitating conditions, fundamental to the understanding of any securitizing move discourse; 
the following chapter will be devoted to uncovering the tools and themes used throughout 
UNASUR’s discourse attempting at securitizing South American natural resources. In order to 
do so, let us first recall some basic theoretical advancements seen in the first chapter.  
 According to the CS, a securitization process comprises of: an actor (UNASUR) 
seeking to securitize a referential object (Strategic Resources - energy, rare minerals) from a 
perceived existential threat (in this sense, the US policy). In practice, such process is executed 
through the “magical” (Bourdieu, 1984) and “performative” (Weaver, 1995) effects of 
discursive means. In the eyes of the Copenhagen School, discursive means only cover what is 
referred to as “speech acts” (Buzan et al, page). In a similar analytical fashion and yet on a 
contrasting methodological level, others (Williams, 2003; Trombetta, 2015, Balzaq, 2010; 
Deudney, 1999) expand discursive means to include additional forms of expression such as 
images and/or written words. Through this, an actor seeks to reach the consent of an 
“empowering audience” (Balzaq, 40) - problematic in this study - allowing him to deal with 
the security issue through “special measures” (Buzan et al). These measures may allow for the 
use of the military, revealing how the issue has escaped the normal rules of the community, in 
its transition from a initially non-politicized, to a politicized and finally securitized stage 
(whereby it escapes any form of control from the political sphere).  
 An actor may refer to ideational tools to further legitimize his claims. Archyara 
(2011), having coined the concept of Norm Subsidiarity, sees this apparatus as “weapon of the 
weak” (119) by which states seek to resist a given hegemonic actor in a general aim to secure 
their autonomy. The concept is helpful to the understanding of how weaker states seek to 
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resist through ideational means. It may be applied to “region which share similar historical 
(colonial ⁄ semi-colonial status), political (weak socio-political cohesion and regime 
insecurity), and strategic (marginalization through great power dominance and hypocrisy) 
conditions” (113) - regardless of whether these latter claims are constructed or not, the 
concept remains extremely relevant for the frame of our analysis.  
 Related to Latin America, he identifies the most commonly used norms and principles 
that the latter use in a way to guarantee their autonomy and limit external oversight: 
“sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and self-determination, equality of states, 
racial equality, nonintervention, and (…) the principle of regional autonomy (102). These 
have been recurrent themes in the continuous struggles of the region to secure its 
independence from colonial and imperialistic patterns. Bolivarianism has been a historical 
source for such ideational basis as it comprises of ‘‘ideas that rejected imperiaIism (…) 
defended sovereignty, self-determination, and nonintervention, and encouraged Latin 
American coordination and cooperation’’ (113). Such theoretical understandings are key to 
our discursive analysis.  
4. 1 - Recurrent Themes 
 Confronted to what is perceived as an increasingly antagonistic US approach, marked 
by an increased military presence in the region (Bruckman 2011, Battaglino 2012), South 
American states have sought to protect their resources - whether water, energy or land - by 
attempting to securitize them through militarized means (Nolte & Whener 2015, 13). The 
Brazilian National Defense indicates in that sense that: “while developing the Hypotheses of 
Employment, the Military Strategy of Defense shall include the employment the Armed 
Forces considering the following aspects, among others: the threat of far superior military 
forces in the Amazon region” (Nolte & Whener, 2013, 182). The issue has echoed on the 
regional scale as “there seems to be growing consensus within UNASUR that regional 
cooperation is necessary as a means to guarantee the defence of strategic natural 
resources” (183). 
 As illustrated previously, there is plenty of evidence of regional cooperation on 
security risks emanating from within the region and yet non with specific regards to a 
common defense strategy serving the purpose of securing strategic resources. The wide range 
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of countries in the region equals to a wide range of interests meaning that the perception of an 
imminent threat diverges considerably. Although cooperation in the area of security/defense is 
considered the raison d’être of UNASUR, not reaching any consensus on such matter may 
very well undermine to a larger extent any hopes of strengthening the regional block: “the 
absence of a common regional threat makes states less l ikely to push 
for integration.” (Battaglino, 96). In line with this logic, material aspects of regionalism make 
no sense without any ideational basis. Bringing us to the paradoxical conclusion that, in order 
to progress, the organization needs to establish a common accepted vision on defense issues. 
In other words mere material factors play a lesser role than ideational ones in their 
contribution to regional integration. 
 In this context of regional fragmentation, the SDC has since then been completed with 
yet another body: the South American Center of Strategic Studies for Defense (CEED). 
Founded in 2011 and located in Buenos Aires, its objective is to formulated common views 
and assess common strategic interests through which South American governments may 
identify with and thus enhance cooperation in the realms of defense (Nolte and Whener, 2013, 
184). In a Copenhagen School’s perspective, the CEED may therefore be considered a central 
actor in the construction of discourse, and thus extremely worthy of analysis as such. Its 
director during the Ali Rodriguez Araque (hereupon ‘Rodríguez’) administration (2012-2014), 
Alfredo Forti, notably published published a paper called “La Defensa de los Recursos 
Naturales en Suramérica” (2014). We believe that the report reflects precisely and explicitly 
UNASUR’s discourse and may therefore be taken as an exemplification of UNASUR’s claims 
during Ali Rodriguez Araque’s mandate. Besides from other contribtution (Bruckmann 2011) 
we use his paper as the main piece for identifying in the following section the recurrent 
themes conveyed by the discourse. Following this account we will briefly discuss what may 
be the plausible effects intended by such a discourse as a preliminary path to our final 
conclusion.  
4.1.1 - The Value of Our Natural Resources 
 The most common point emphasized in the report is the “fabulous” aspect of South 
American natural resources (Forti, 16). Their value is determined in a scientific manner via 
the chronic reference to scientific studies and empirical data (Forti, 5-7). In the frame of CS’s 
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views on Environmental Security, this latter point is key as the scientific agenda very much 
validates the actor’s political agenda and thus a powerful source of legitimization with regards 
to its audience: “the scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat for 
securitizing moves” (Buzan et al, 72) due to “the prestige and power of epistemic 
communities” (73). 
 The sets of data depict a world characterized by uncontrolled demographic growth 
leading to ever increasing demands while, in parallel, the diminution of supply; in turn 
increasing the value of natural resources - these being largely located in South America (Forti, 
7). As such, natural wealth is presented in a dualistic manner. In the one hand it may equal to 
an increase the region’s countries and thus UNASUR’s bargaining power on the international 
stage. As Rodríguez notes: “ (…) el enorme potencial que tiene la región suramericana, que es 
depositaria de ingentes recursos naturales de la más diversa índole, diversidad (…) 
complementa los esfuerzos nacionales para alcanzar el desarrollo y bienestar de sus pueblos y 
fortalecer la presencia y el rol de UNASUR en el ámbito internacional” (Forti, 10). 
 The richness of the region is however somehow not fully exploited, as members, 
through non coordinated policies, fail to see the inherent potential represented by having such 
natural resources: “somos al mismo tiempo una región que ha subestimado el valor de 
concebir en clave regional un plan estratégico de gestión y explotación de nuestras 
inconmensurables riquezas, a efectos de garantizar el control, acceso y usufructo endógeno de 
las mismas, condición del desarrollo sostenible de nuestras naciones y nuestra 
población” (Forti, 7). The belonging of these natural resources to South American countries is 
clearly emphasized “nuestras”.  
 On the other hand, especially in a context of ever growing demand, such abundance is 
threatened by its binary opposite: extra-regional scarcity and appetite (8). Appetite becomes 
uncontrolled and ultimately dangerous when originating from an extra-regional power 
“contrariamente, cuando un recurso es escaso para un actor –en especial, si es uno de 
proyección internacional–, dicho recurso se constituye también en estratégico para el 
poseedor, aunque éste carezca de los medios para su explotación y aprovechamiento.” (Forti, 
8). It is clear that so far, by combining the facts of unchecked demographic control and the 
increasingly strategic aspects of the resources, the discourse echoes the catastrophist Resource 
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Scarcity and Violent Conflict Thesis Catastrophist. Such view sees the world as chaotic, 
whereby scarcity will fatally lead to intra and interstate conflict and anarchy.  
4.1.2 - Regional Fragmentation in an Alarming Global Context 
 Opposite to these powers of international projection, whom by their ‘appetite’ for 
natural resources are depicted as dangerous, stands a fragmented and fragile region unwilling 
to see the geo-strategic nature of the resources and incapable managing their exploitation: “La 
ausencia de política regional en la materia, ignora un factor de alcance geoestratégico 
fundamental, cual es que la abundancia de recursos en nuestra región tiene como contracara la 
escasez y la apetencia de los mismos para actores extra regionales” (Forti, 7). He continues by 
stressing the need for a common approach since fragmentation will inevitably lead to regional 
incapacity to protect its immeasurable natural wealth: “ninguno de nuestros Estados puede por 
sí solo brindar y garantizar la protección y defensa efectiva de los fabulosos recursos y 
reservas de activos estratégicos que posee nuestra región, sino que ello sólo puede ser logrado 
y mantenido a partir de la coordinación y el esfuerzo cooperativo multilateral o, lo que es lo 
mismo, de una estrategia y política común de alcance regional.” (Forti, 16). In other words, 
his rationale follows the popular moto “Unity is Strength”.  
4.1.3 - Foreign Appropriation 
 In line with this logic is the idea that the increasingly transnationalization of the 
region’s economies, the “mercantilization” and “capitalization” (Bruckman, 19) of the natural 
resources has facilitated the appropriation process by an organized set of foreign actors while 
against these lies a set of unorganized and dispersed South American countries (Forti, 8). 
Bruckman (2011) makes a correlation foreign appropriation with the presence of US troops. 
In other words, private interests are inherently linked to the US: “En el caso peruano, el 
loteamiento de la Amazonía peruana para exploración y explotación de petróleo y gas a través 
de concesiones de largo plazo a empresas transnacionales (…) estuvo acompañada de una 
creciente presencia militar de Estados Unidos en el territorio peruano (…) Entre 2003 y 2010 
ingresaron un total de 87,516 militares estadounidenses (11). 
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4.1.4 - Natural Resources as Intrinsically Linked to Sovereignty   
 Faced with this appetite and greed driven extractivist appropriation, there is an 
urgency to control and regulate resources in a way to guarantee sovereign access to these 
resources and in turn guarantee regional energy security: “[hay] una necesidad crucial lograr 
su control y aprovechamiento sustentable mientras que para otros Estados dependientes de 
tales recursos, la necesidad y objetivo estratégico es asegurar el acceso a los mismos.” (Forti, 
15). Through this Forti seeks to re-affirm soveirgnty and territorial integrity of UNASUR 
members with regards to their natural resources. Similarly: “La soberanía de los recursos 
naturales es para también el Secretario General Alí Rodríguez el elemento vertebrador sobre 
la que debe girar la UNASUR y sobre el que hay que articular una visión estratégica 
compartida” (Sanahuja & Escasez, 506). 
4.1.5 - Natural Resources a Regional Good and Regional Interest  
 A common theme of these studies is to highlight to the vulnerability of the region in a 
way to justify the paradigmatic search for interests shared by all members in a way to end 
with the region’s chronic fragmentation. Complementary to the re-affirmation of sovereignty 
comes, paradoxically, the stress of regioness nature of South American natural resources: 
many of these are shared between different countries and go beyond borders thus part of the 
region’s identity. As such, natural resources are an axis through which multiple countries 
share common interests thus laying the ground for a common regional strategy: “no hay 
mayor ejemplo paradigmático que ilustre este concepto de “interés regional” como los 
cuantiosos recursos naturales estratégicos que abundan en Suramérica y que por su 
diseminación que no respeta fronteras, constituyen de hecho activos comunes a nuestros doce 
países de UNASUR.” (Forti, 15).In addition, he specifically emphasizes the divine potential 
of the common interest, as being the cornerstone upon which a historically fragemented 
region, in spite of the numerous previous regional projects, may finally cooperate and 
integrate “por vez primera desde nuestras gestas independentistas del siglo XIX la actual 
coyuntura política regional nos presenta a los suramericanos una de las mayores 
oportunidades de integrar a doce países en una unidad en términos tanto geopolíticos como 
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geoeconómicos.” (Forti, 8). Natural resources seem organically linked to the region’s 
historical independentist claims - a clear hint to Bolivarianism.  
4.1.6 - The Need for a Regional Force 
 Faced with a foreign militaristic approach, cooperation is the only solution to the 
region’s coming tribulations, a strategy dissuading any intruders: “Disuasion “hacia fuera”, 
implica que nuestras capacidades regionales en materia de defensa y militar deben 
concentrarse y fundirse en una sola cuando de lo que se trata es proteger al interés regional 
que representan los recursos naturales suramericanos frente al eventual accionar de terceros 
Estados.” (Forti, 18).  In order to add to the policy’s dissuasiveness, he proposes the creation 
a regional intergovernmental militarily body in the form of the South American Armed Forces 
(FMS) (20). These are seen as necessary to restrict “toda amenaza estatal extra-regional que 
atente contra la integridad territorial de nuestra región y de sus activos comunes.” (Forti, 20). 
4.2 - Discussion: Intended Effects 
 The exclusion of the U.S from the South American sphere is clearly the main effect 
wished here. The alienation is attempted through the use of a differentiation process: 
“UNASUR and its member states use a differentiation process between the Self (UNASUR) 
and the Other (the United States)” (Weiffen et al, 383). Such process enables the region to 
demarcate which actors are “in and out” (383), granting UNASUR some kind of authoritative 
power. The differentiation technique presents the US as essentially different, which, combined 
with its historical regional reputation as an intervening hegemon, only adds to the fear of it. 
What is intended here to trigger a negative vision of the United States by an audience. This 
fear of the other is notably exacerbated through the use of the Resource Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict Thesis, which implies a chaotic world in which none, apart from familiar actor, may 
be actors. The creation of a regional self implies the creation of sense of belonging thereby 
triggering a common regional perspective towards the necessity of protecting the region. 
Finally, the depiction of a regional self as a separate identity is reinforced by the historical 
norms, set of principles captured in ideologies that add to the sense of a South American 
identity. As such: “The differentiation process between UNASUR and something that is 
outside this regional organization becomes a reason for its existence” (Weiffen et al, 383).  
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 Such process clearly illustrates the continuous presence of historical discourse 
regarding the region’s independence, and notably in this case ‘Bolivarianism’. The narration 
plays a dual and yet self-reinforcing role. First, it conveys principles such as self-
determination, territorial integrity, sovereignty . These norms are considered as part of the 4
global narrative (102). Through their use, UNASUR seeks to ensure its members autonomy, 
an organization wishing to portray itself as protective any external interference. On the other 
hand, Bolivarianism is historically synonymous of regional cohesion and integration. It 
reinforces the sense of belonging in which the region may only resist imperialistic others and 
thus secure its autonomy through cohesion: “A key source of regional norms, Bolivarianism, 
was explicitly geared toward regional autonomy (…) Although Bolivar’s dream of a Latin 
American political union never materialized, Latin American regional interactions became the 
springboard of ‘‘ideas that rejected imperiaIism, defended sovereignty, self-determination, and 
nonintervention, and encouraged Latin American coordination and cooperation’’” (Acharya, 
113).  
 We in sum witness here a fusion between the two effects identified by Achyara: the 
resisting/challenging effect, combined with the supportive/strengthening effect. Indeed, 
invoking globally accepted norms such as self determination and territorial integrity 
(corresponding to the supportive/strengthing effect) delegitimizes foreign great power 
intervention by notably highlighting its hypocrisy (102). Such delegitimization should 
ultimately refrain any forms of direct or indirect interference; an effect further acknowledged 
with the formulation of local alternative norms - such as the creation of a South American 
identity  (corresponding to the so called resisting/challening effect).  
 These variables have the general effect of defining the United States’ policy as 
inherently antagonistic, an enemy, when related to the matter of natural resources, and 
therefore a threat - not merely a risk - to the region’s existence. Via these techniques, 
UNASUR seeks to trigger a general consent in region that regional defense cooperation is 
necessary to protect its natural wealth. In sum, it convinces an audience, UNASUR members, 
of the necessity to deal with the issue special measures: that is the creation of South American 
 These norms have been institutionalized, as being the SDC’s raison-d’être “On a March 2008 visit to 4
Washington, Brazilian Defence Minister Nelson Jobim announced the intention to create the South American 
Defence Council (SADC), a body ‘based on the principles of non-intervention, sovereignty and 
territoriality” (Battaglino, 81). 
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Army. In this sense, the discourse, as exemplified by Forti’s report, is clearly an attempt to 
securitize natural resources, following the process described by the Copenhagen School. 
5 - Conclusions 
 In sum, may one categorically assess UNASUR’s approach to natural resources as a 
formal and explicit example of securitization in line with the Copenhagen School 
Framework? Theoretically, the necessary components of a securitizing processes seem to 
coincide: an actor (UNASUR, CEED), seeking through discursive means to construct an issue 
in order to get the consent of an audience (Paradoxically, the Members) to accept the use of 
special measures (FMS) to deal with the existential threat (U.S) menacing a referential object 
(Natural Resources), with the help of facilitating conditions (Global Context). However, in 
this sense, even though the audience is by nature quite difficult to conceptualize here, it 
clearly does not agree. To our information there is still no sign of UNASUR being a collective 
defense organization with an autonomous regional army (FMS). Thus, the answer seems to be 
negative, as UNASUR, in our eyes, is solely attempting to do so. As such, what we essentially 
sought to understand through this study was the reason for this attempt, how it attempts to do 
so, through which means, and for which purposes.  
 The initial reasons for its securitizing move may be found in a conjuncture of reasons. 
First, if unchanged, the global context seems to indicate to an increase in the demand for 
natural resources, many of these being in South America. This has a dualistic effect, on the 
one side it seen as a blessing - increased economic and political for the organization and its 
members - and yet on the other the perceived threat of external appetite driven intervention. In 
face of such scenario lies a region polarized by the natural resources themselves - these being 
intstrumentalized unilaterally by the members for power projection purposes - under the 
umbrella of a seemingly ineffective regional organization - unable to trigger a coordinated 
regional response to inside fragmentation - through regional energy strategies - and towards 
the outside - multidimensional and cooperative security are effective indeed, yet related to 
natural resources and their defense they have paradoxically not had the effect wished. By 
allowing too much flexibility, state centric attitudes seem to prevail thus making no 
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generalized effort to consent to a a common strategy - whether on a regional energy policy or 
one directed towards the outside, notably in the face of possible extra regional intruder.  
 In face of such fragmentation, UNASUR has sought to construct a discourse playing 
here again a dualistic role. On the one hand it may be interpreted as a means for normative 
resistance part of a broader post hegemonic-regional project. It resists a perceived US threat 
by calling for more autonomy through subsidiary norms, and what we believe is the historical 
figure of Bolivarianism. Some assess that the emergence of a SDC is a clear illustration of the 
region’s autonomy, and thus the clear evidence of post hegemonic world. Yet others, point at 
the expansion of the U.S to the region through notably an increased military presence, and 
thus ultimately illustrating the failure of UNASUR ideational attempt to resist through 
normative dissidence and norm subsidiarity. Thus, on the other hand, the role of the discourse 
is to trigger a material response from the region towards the U.S. Yet, organization, by lacking 
the material means (there is no consensus regarding common approaches to regional defense), 
seeks to impulse - by exarcebating the image of the U.S a inherently, culturally, economically 
and ethnically different (differentiation process) - a response from the members, that is win 
their consent so that it may transit from being a merely cooperative security organization to a 
full on collective defense one, meaning a South American Army. While such technique seems 
rather ineffiencent so far - the securitization not being valid -  it nonetheless seems quite 
innovative. A strategy, in times of increasingly politically polarized region (the end of the so 
called pink tide), that the current the administrations heading the UNASUR could very well 
adopt, this time transposed towards China.  
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